SECURE BY DESIGN SERIES

Linux Kernel Security: Overview of Security Features and Hardening

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EXTERNAL

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Agenda

What is a Kernel Configuration?

Security-related Configuration Settings

Reasons for Modifying

Classes of Kernel Security

Cost-Benefit Analysis

Navigating The Complexity

Other Kernel Security Considerations

System Security Considerations



What is a Kernel Configuration?







What is a kernel configuration?

- Commonly referred to as the default configuration or defconfig
- List of all the configuration options which can be enabled or disabled inside Linux kernel

Why is it relevant to security hardening?

- Most configuration options have security implications
- Example: i.MX 8 kernel config file currently has 8673 lines (Linux Kernel 5.4.3_2.0.0)
- Example: i.MX 8 kernel defconfig file currently has 1056 lines (Linux Kernel 5.4.3_2.0.0)
- Enormous amount of configuration options to consider

#
Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT.
Linux/arm64 5.4.3 Kernel Configuration
#
#
Compiler: aarch64-poky-linux-gcc (GCC) 8.3.0
#
CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y
CONFIG_GCC_VERSION=80300
CONFIG_CLANG_VERSION=0
CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_INLINE=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_WARN_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED=y

What does a kernel configuration look like?

CONFIG IRQ WORK=y CONFIG_BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT=y CONFIG THREAD INFO IN TASK=y # # General setup # CONFIG_INIT_ENV_ARG_LIMIT=32 # CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST is not set # CONFIG HEADER TEST is not set # CONFIG LOCALVERSION="-imx 5.4.3 2.0.0" CONFIG LOCALVERSION AUTO=y # CONFIG BUILD SALT="" CONFIG DEFAULT HOSTNAME="(none)" CONFIG SWAP=y

CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y CONFIG_SYSVIPC_SYSCTL=y CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y CONFIG POSIX MQUEUE SYSCTL=y CONFIG CROSS MEMORY ATTACH=y #CONFIG USELIB is not set CONFIG AUDIT=y CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL=y CONFIG AUDITSYSCALL=y # IRQ subsystem CONFIG GENERIC IRQ PROBE=y CONFIG GENERIC IRQ SHOW=y CONFIG GENERIC IRQ SHOW LEVEL=y What does a kernel default configuration look like (defconfig)? Minimal subset of the config

CONFIG LOCALVERSION="-imx 5.4.3 2.0.0" CONFIG SYSVIPC=y CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y CONFIG AUDIT=y CONFIG NO HZ IDLE=y CONFIG HIGH RES TIMERS=y CONFIG PREEMPT=y CONFIG IRQ TIME ACCOUNTING=y CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT=y CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT_V3=y CONFIG TASKSTATS=y CONFIG TASK DELAY ACCT=y CONFIG_TASK_XACCT=y CONFIG TASK IO ACCOUNTING=y CONFIG IKCONFIG=y

CONFIG IKCONFIG PROC=y CONFIG NUMA BALANCING=y CONFIG MEMCG=y CONFIG MEMCG SWAP=y CONFIG BLK CGROUP=y CONFIG CGROUP PIDS=y CONFIG CGROUP HUGETLB=y CONFIG CPUSETS=y CONFIG CGROUP DEVICE=y CONFIG CGROUP CPUACCT=y CONFIG CGROUP PERF=y CONFIG NAMESPACES=y CONFIG USER NS=y CONFIG SCHED AUTOGROUP=y CONFIG RELAY=y

CONFIG BLK_DEV_INITRD=y CONFIG EXPERT=y CONFIG_KALLSYMS_ALL=y # CONFIG COMPAT BRK is not set CONFIG PROFILING=y CONFIG JUMP LABEL=y CONFIG MODULES=y CONFIG MODULE UNLOAD=y # CONFIG_IOSCHED_DEADLINE is not set CONFIG ARCH SUNXI=y CONFIG ARCH ALPINE=y CONFIG ARCH BCM2835=y CONFIG ARCH BCM IPROC=y CONFIG ARCH BERLIN=y CONFIG ARCH BRCMSTB=y

How do you understand all of these options?

- Menuconfig
 - Yocto: bitbake -c menuconfig virtual/kernel
- Linux Kernel Driver Database
 - o <u>https://cateee.net/lkddb/</u>
- Bootlin / GitHub / CodeAurora if you need to delve into source
 - <u>https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source</u>
 - <u>https://github.com/torvalds/linux</u>
 - <u>https://source.codeaurora.org/external/imx/linux-imx/</u>

Menuconfig:



Menuconfig: use forward slash to search for a term

Search Configuration Parameter Enter (sub)string or regexp to search for (with or without "CONFIG_")]
CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR]
<mark>< Ok ></mark> < Help >	

.config - Linux/arm64 5.4.3 Kernel Configuration > Search (CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)	
Search Results	1
Symbol: HARDEN BRANCH PREDICTOR [=y]	
Type : bool	
Prompt: Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks Location:	
(1) -> Kernel Features	
Defined at arch/arm64/Kconfig:1083	

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Security-related Configuration Settings: Reasons for Modifying a Setting





- When hardening the kernel, there are generally four categories of reason for which a configuration item may be enabled or disabled:
 - 1) Enable configurations that protect against known exploits
 - 2) Disable configurations that are known to be exploitable
 - 3) Enable security features that make it harder to hack
 - 4) Reduce attack surface by disabling unused configurations

 1) Adding an additional level of protection against a known exploit by enabling a configuration item.

For example:

- Enabling CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR to protect against Spectre-related speculation attacks
 - Speculation attacks against some high performance processors rely on being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim context by executing aliasing branches in the attacker context. Such attacks can be partially mitigated against by clearing the internal branch predictor state and limiting the prediction logic in some situations.

\$ cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep bugs

: spectre_v1 spectre_v2 spec_store_bypass swapgs itlb_multihit srbds

bugs

- 2) Disabling a configuration item or subsystem which is known to be exploitable.
 For example:
 - Disabling the USB networking subsystem (USB_USBNET=is not set), so that applications using network-based IPC(InterProcessor Communication) mechanisms may not be inadvertently exposed through a USB port.
 - Disabling /dev/mem access to physical memory (DEVMEM=is not set), so that physical memory cannot be easily modified.

- 3) Enabling general security strengthening features in the kernel (which may not necessarily protect against a presently known attack).
 - Reducing the risk of memory page leakage by enabling page poisoning (PAGE_POISONING=Y) to overwrite any potentially sensitive information upon freeing.
 - Enabling Security-Enhanced Linux

- 4) Disabling any unused kernel configuration options. If you don't need it, disable it.
 - This reduces the potential attack surface. If an option is not enabled, then it cannot be exploited!
 - \circ Example
 - Disable Serial / UART console driver if not used in production
 - Disable eFuse driver
 - Disable ethernet driver if not used in production

Quick Overview







- Further breaking down the reasons for setting a configuration item:
 - 1) Memory Protections
 - Stack canaries
 - Usercopy Protections
 - 2) GCC plugins
 - 3) Module Loading Security
 - 4) Security Policy Management
 - 5) Attack Surface Reduction
 - 6) File System Hardening

- Memory Protections
 - Items which protect against memory exploitation
 - CONFIG_BUG=y
 - CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y
 - CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL=Y
 - Stack Canaries
 - Canary in a coal mine...
 - Warn of an unexpected stack change by checking for bad canary value
 - CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y
 - Usercopy Protections
 - CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=Y
 - Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR)
 - CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY=Y
 - Memory Information exposure
 - PROC_VMCORE=is not set
 - Heap Overflow
 - COMPAT_BRK=is not set

- GCC plugins
 - Actions which GCC can perform at compile time to help protect against exploitation
 - Example:
 - CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY=Y
 - CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT=Y
 - CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK=y
 - CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL=Y
 - CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=Y
 - CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_ARM_SSP_PER_TASK=Y

- Module Loading Security
 - These help protect loadable kernel modules (or disables them altogether)
 - Example:
 - CONFIG_MODULES=is not set
 - If you don't need MODULES, disable them altogether. Otherwise:
 - CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=y
 - CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL=y
 - CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512=Y
 - CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE=y
 - CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX=Y

- Security Policy Management
 - Additional policy management actions which can be used to improve security
 - Some of these are very detailed / need a separate presentation
 - CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y
 - Security Enhanced Linux
 - Example:
 - CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y
 - CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE=y
 - SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM=Y
 - SECURITY_SAFESETID=Y
 - SECURITY_LOADPIN=Y

- Attack Surface Reduction
 - General options which can be set to minimize the amount of attack vectors available
 - Example:
 - CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS=is not set
 - CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT=-1
 - DEVMEM=is not set
 - KEXEC=is not set
 - DEVKMEM=is not set
 - TRACING=is not set
 - FTRACE=is not set
 - DEBUG_FS=is not set
 - STAGING=is not set
 - KALLSYMS=is not set

- File System Protections
 - File system encryption and/or verification
 - DM_VERITY=Y
 - read only
 - DM_CRYPT=Y
 - encryption
 - DM_INTEGRITY=Y
 - integrity checking which still permits writable file system







- Changing configuration options is not without impact:
 - Compile Time
 - Kernel Binary Size
 - \circ Boot Time
 - Processor Performance
- Up to you to decide which options are warranted for your system

- Compilation Time
 - This is especially true for security features which are checked by the compiler during compile time.
 - For example, the GCC_PLUGIN options:
 - CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=Y
 - Added compilation time is well worth the added security.

- Kernel Binary Size
 - This is usually not a concern. Adding and removing features may change the kernel size by a few megabytes, which is generally negligible on most modern systems
 - If you have extremely small storage requirements, then disabling features for space can help.

- Boot time
 - \circ $\,$ For example:
 - DM_CRYPT=y
 - Adds drive encryption capabilities to your kernel
 - \circ The more drivers that are enabled, the longer the kernel will take to load
 - Most drivers add a negligible amount of time by themselves (~10-100 milliseconds)
 - Cumulatively adds up...
 - More important if targeting <5-10 second total boot times

- Processor Performance
 - This is perhaps the most concerning option and must be determined by trial and error.
 - \circ $\,$ For example:
 - Erasing memory with PAGE_POISONING_ZERO=Y will use CPU cycles.
 - Disabling/hardening speculative branching will degrade CPU performance
 - CONFIG_RETPOLINE (Intel)
 - HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR=Y (Arm)
 - INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON=Y
 - REFCOUNT_FULL=Y
 - SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=Y







- Analyzing, understanding, and modifying the kernel configuration with these tasks in mind is not trivial.
 - Plan accordingly! Security conscious company must allocate time or resources
- Many companies have two separate configurations (development and production)
- Maintenance burden once you have created your final configuration.
 - Kernel Updates / Patches→new configuration items
 - Consider: At the time you release your product the kernel may be secure. Within a few years, there may be multiple released zero-day exploits for that kernel version.
 - Security is not once and done

- NXP's Community Forum
 - <u>https://community.nxp.com/t5/OSS-Security-Maintenance/bd-p/ossecmaib</u>
- Are there any solutions which handle these configuration items?
 - Kernel Self Protection Project
 - <u>https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project</u>
 - \circ CLIP OS
 - https://clip-os.org/en/

• Timesys has a tool which will scan your kernel configuration and produce a list of recommendations

• Commands which were run in the previous video:

#Build basic imx8mq EVK yocto build with a 5.4.3 kernel

\$ repo init - u https://source.codeaurora.org/external/imx/imx - manifest - b imx - linux - zeus - m imx - 5.4.3 - 2.0.0.xml

meta - timesys - vigishield.git

- \$ repo sync
- \$ DISTRO=fsl imx wayland MACHINE=imx8mqevk source imx setup release.sh b build
- \$ bitbake core image minimal

#Add Timesys meta layer to bblayers.conf

- \$ cd ../sources/
- \$ git clone git@src.timesys.com:timesys/features/
- \$ cd ../build/
- \$ nano conf/bblayers.conf

#Add layers to bblayer.conf

- > Add:

\${BSPDIR}/sources/meta - timesys - vigishield \${BSPDIR}/sources/meta - timesys

#Inherit timesys - kernel - check
\$ nano conf/local.conf
-> Add:

```
INHERIT += "timesys-kernel-check"
```

#Rebuild

```
$ bitbake core-image-minimal
```

#View report

```
$ libreoffice timesys_kernel_hardening_results.csv
```

Timesys VigiShield







Timesys VigiShield

- Security Hardening Layer for i.MX processors
 - Secure Boot
 - High Assurance Boot (i.MX 6, i.MX 7, i.MX 8M Families) / Advanced High Assurance Boot (i.MX 8/8X Families)
 - Root File System Encryption
 - Root File System Verification
 - UUU Helpers (Universal Update Utility)
 - JTAG disablement
 - Secure fuse programming
 - Kernel Configuration Checking
 - Offline Firmware Update (encrypted and signed)







- Kernel Versions
 - Older kernel = More unpatched Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)
 - <u>https://cve.mitre.org/index.html</u>
 - Keep your kernel updated to the latest LTS kernel if possible
 - NXP releases are based on LTS kernels
- Check your included open source software packages for Common Vulnerabilities and Exploitations (CVEs) on the <u>national vulnerability database</u>
- A typical embedded system has hundreds or thousands of these packages which must be checked. There are tools which can help!
 - Vigiles Vulnerability Management
 - Can filter for vulnerabilities based on your kernel configuration as well
 - Timesys BSP maintenance team can help monitor and maintain security for you



Other Security Considerations

• Commands which were run in the previous video:

Set up configuration:

\$ nano conf/local.conf

Add:

#Inherit Timesys Vigiles CVE checker INHERIT += "vigiles"

Build:

\$ bitbake core - image - minimal

- System Control Settings (sysctl)
 - Kernel runtime configuration parameters
 - Example:
 - kernel.dmesg_restrict
- Discretionary Access Control
 - \circ Check your file system permissions and controls
 - Minimize uses of SUID and GUID where possible

• Commands which were run in the previous video:

Set up configuration:

\$ nano conf/local.conf

Add:

#Inherit Timesys DAC report generator

INHERIT += "timesys - discretionary - access - report"

Build:

\$ bitbake core - image - minimal

View results:

\$ libreoffice /mnt/HDD2/Projects/NXP

- Webinar/build/timesys_dac.csv

- Mandatory Access Control
 - Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux)
 - NSA's answer to discretionary access controls (DAC) shortcomings
 - Adds more privilege control than typical DAC
 - User-customizable security policy on running processes and their actions
 - Operation permissions are checked after DAC

- A very comprehensive list of exploits that have been performed in the past can be found here:
 - <u>https://github.com/xairy/linux-kernel-exploitation</u>
 - \circ $\,$ Also includes some links for defenses and other items
 - Tons to look at!

Takeaways

- There are many security related options configuration options in the Linux kernel
- You must tailor them to fit your requirements
- Make security requirements part of your product requirements from day 1
- Consider using Timesys VigiShield
 - Ready-to-use Yocto that provides security out of the box for i.MX processors
- If needed, leverage assistance of experienced security development teams from NXP and Timesys:
 - Product security design
 - Configuration and implementation of needed security features
 - Additional security documentation
 - Security verification
 - Compliance alignment
- Start with initial non-binding conversation



Upcoming Webinars







- Secure Software Updates: Designing OTA Updates for secure embedded Linux systems
- Linux System Hardening: Securing your embedded device from the risk of being compromised

Previous Webinars







Previous Webinars

Secure By Design Series

- Trusted Execution Environments: Getting Started with OP-TEE on i.MX Processors
- Software integrity and data confidentiality: Establishing secure boot and chain of trust on i.MX processors
- Securing Embedded Linux Devices: Pitfalls to Avoid

Stay Secure (Vigiles) Series

- Best practices for triaging Common Vulnerabilities & Exposures (CVEs) in embedded systems
- Full Life Cycle Security Maintenance of Embedded Linux BSPs
- BSP security maintenance: Best practices for vulnerability monitoring & remediation
- Software Security Management: Cutting through the vulnerability storm with NXP Vigiles

For More Information and to Become More Secure





Timesys is an embedded Linux security expert and NXP Gold Partner. To discuss your project, please contact us at <u>sales@timesys.com</u>

Use this link to go to Services for securing your device

Thank You!



Q&A





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